Edit this record. Mark as duplicate. Find it on Scholar. Request removal from index. Revision history. Google Books no proxy Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server Configure custom proxy use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy. Configure custom resolver. By Matson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, , pp. Mellor eds. Harmon R. Holcomb - - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 4 Physics and Metaphysics: Theories of Space and Time. Philosophers tend to describe a major transition in evolution as a phase of emergence of a new level—with new units—of selection.
As we have seen 2. Pradeu Biologists can turn to philosophy in two different ways: by reflecting philosophically on their own work or by naturalizing philosophical problems. In the first case, biologists get interested in issues of epistemology or methodology, and, from the ground of their work, they extrapolate ways of thinking or modes of inference.
Naturalization happens when science becomes capable to say something significant and constraining about a traditional topic of philosophy, exemplified here by the origin of morality. It is not infrequent that biologists undertake philosophical reflections on their own work. This is eased by the fact that some tasks of philosophy, such as conceptual analysis or linguistic clarification, are integral parts of scientific work see also 2. Indeed, one might say that biologists, being experts about their own theories, are sometimes more qualified than philosophers to reflect on their own work.
But what about the tendency to generality that characterizes philosophy of biology section2? Well, the generalizing route, too, can be followed by working scientists. With a good philosophical background, a biologist can match more effectively with debates in philosophical areas. Their aims may go beyond strict functionality for their own research and reach a genuine desire for capturing, defending, or criticizing something deep about their own science.
Two examples—among many others—of very influential, philosophically-oriented biologists are ornithologist Ernst Mayr and paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould. Ernst Mayr was one of the greatest evolutionary biologists of the20th century, but he also increasingly worked in the history and philosophy of biology.
Some of his areas of reflection were the distinction between proximate and ultimate causes, the nature of the neo-Darwinian synthesis, and the centrality of speciation and species defined by his Biological Species Concept see 3. His main concern was the methodology of systematics. Mayr had promoted a new systematics, looking for variation in large samples as opposed to few type specimens, and considering geography, genetics, and other sources as opposed to morphology only.
As Carl Chung reconstructs, Mayr was first to formulate the distinction between typological and population thinking in A few years later, Mayr started pushing population thinking as the major innovation introduced by Charles Darwin and developed by biology as a natural historical science, different and autonomous from other sciences. As Chung points out, the main battlefield for this opposition was the concept of species. For Mayr, the incarnation of typological thinking in biology is the morphological species concept, according to which individuals belong to the same species by virtue of sharing their morphological characteristics.
By contrast, biological species concepts are population concepts. For sure, one goal was. Chung: It was generally taken up by philosophers and philosophically-minded scientists such as Michael T. Ghiselin—notice the philosophical title of his book Metaphysics and the Origin of Species. Statements like the distinction between ultimate and proximate causes became common currency for scientists.
Scientists may end up doing philosophy if they get interested in the inferential structure of their own field. Inference, that is reasoning and its rules,is a classic topic in philosophy of science. Induction , deduction, and inference to the best explanation IBE are basic, well known types of inference, but, in scientific practice, they multiply and get combined and put to work in different ways, producing interesting conceptual and philosophical problems.
Stephen Jay Gould was a prolific writer see more in section 5. Among his many favorite targets were a few inferential patterns employed by evolutionary biologists. The adaptationist inference was definitely one of the main ones since the famous Spandrels paper with Richard Lewontin Other biologists, like G. Williams , had advanced proposals for revising adaptationist inferences on different grounds. Adaptationism consists in explaining biological phenomena by claiming that they are adaptations.
In the Spandrels paper, Gould and Lewontin used the metaphor of the San Marco cathedral in Venice to argue that even structures that exploit fundamental functions can nonetheless result, originally, as structural byproducts of a whole architecture. As Gould elaborated after the Spandrels paper, between structures and functions there is no one-to-one strict correspondence, but rather, redundancy.
Adaptive explanations will rarely suffice. In any case, they will need to be made testable and tested Pievani and Serrelli We may intend something which is being positively selected, or something whose existence is due to natural selection in the past Godfrey-Smith , Lewens Some scholars elaborated on the dubious ontology and instrumental nature of adaptations, while many others interpreted the challenge as the necessity of making adaptationist hypotheses testable Pievani and Serrelli, cit.
Recently, plant biologist Mark E. Also, selection and constraint are more properly seen as complementary and not in mutual contrast as, for Olson, the Spandrels paper tended to suggest. As customary, philosophical issues raised by biologists have been taken up and elaborated further by philosophers. Commenting on the philosophical literature on adaptationism, Godfrey-Smith distinguished three different issues on which adaptationist, anti-adaptationist and moderate positions can be taken up.
The empirical issue is whether or not natural selection is a powerful and ubiquitous force in the natural world, with few constraints coming from biological variation, and with no comparable, competing causal factor. The explanatory issue is whether the most important questions in biology are about the fitting of organisms and environments, given that natural selection is the only answer to such big problems other processes and explanations are good for less important questions.
The methodological issue is whether or not starting with adaptive hypotheses—and holding to them—is good scientific practice. More than a century later, E. Human behavior, mind, morality, and systems of beliefs constitute the most interesting targets of possible, and controversial, naturalization. Naturalization is what happens when matters that are traditionally philosophical become empirically accessible by some scientific approach or method. In fact, naturalization is critically analyzed by philosophy, and there are many different philosophical positions on naturalism.
So, naturalization is a fruitful object of study for philosophy of biology rather than a topic thief , and philosophy has a warranted place that is not going to evaporate by naturalization. After an initial wholesale opposition, many of them validated the challenge of naturalizing humans. Our species has to be seen as a proper part of the biological world, not as separated by any ontological divide.
At the same time, philosophers highlighted inferential errors in biological explanations of human behaviors, epistemological limits in reconstructing the past, and ethical risks. They pursued theoretical refinements of the project, by improving multi-level selection models, for example. Many criticized the logical-deductive architecture of sociobiology and evolutionary psychology , frequently built on ad hoc hypotheses and adaptationist just-so stories.
The debate is ongoing, and many arguments have been developed. For example, if many human psychological mechanisms are evolutionary novelties due to the interaction of ancestral genes and new environments, then many of these mechanisms are not adaptations and adaptive thinking in evolutionary psychology will fail to identify or explain them.
More cautious, problematized, and integrated endeavors of biological explanation applied to humans are emerging, also under the stimulation of philosophy of biology Sterelny Fast growing fields like neurobiology or cognitive neurosciences seem to be making biology more and more capable of addressing topics such as the origins of morality. Churchland highlighted the role played in this platform by molecules such as oxytocin, an ancient and simple peptide, found in all vertebrates.
In fact, morality would share its neurobiological platform with other familiar phenomena of human life—attachment and bonding. The striking thing is, for Churchland, that modest modifications in existing neural structures can lead to new outcomes. Morality and other phenomena would result from a not-so-exceptional modification of a pre-existing platform involved in mammalian parental cares.
Biological evolution does not achieve adaptations by designing a whole new mechanism from scratch, but modifies what is already in place, little bit by little bit. Social emotions, values, and behavior are not the result of a wholly new engineering plan, but rather an adaptation of existing arrangements and mechanisms that are intimately linked with the self-preserving circuitry for fighting, freezing, and flight, on the one hand, and for rest and digest, on the other.
Churchland Does the evolutionary continuity from mammalian parental care to morality constrain ethics and traditional philosophical theories of morality? While biology can provide information and explanation on the platform for morality, the complexity of cultures provides scaffolding for moral development and definition so that moral decision remains a practical, dialogic, and social problem. However, the more general question is whether and how should moral philosophy—a large and highly technical field—take into any account what the sciences are discovering.
In any case, most philosophers of biology recognize a naturalistic fallacy in the idea that knowing more about the natural world would suffice for making moral, political, and social decisions. For many others, defining philosophy as some kind of underdeveloped science is an expression of scientism and a category mistake regarding fields of knowledge. Many philosophers point out that the biological explanation of social actions, behaviors, and culture, may imply a Darwinian dimension without boiling down to it.
Naturalism is related to, but different from, other very general issues, like determinism or reductionism. Scientistic naturalism considers philosophy as a branch of the natural sciences. Liberalized naturalism includes different epistemic levels of analysis of human nature—from natural sciences to humanities—that share the exclusion of non-natural causes or principles.
Emphasizing the impact of biology on human capacities, social institutions, and ethical values is also a way to justify philosophy of biology as useful or even indispensable to philosophy and, more generally, to the humanities. Some authors Pradeu dislike this anthropocentric strategy in philosophy of biology and think the field could be otherwise justified. Under these overarching debates, human organisms and the human species are understandably a hotspot of problems for philosophy of biology, and biologists and philosophers must confront the growing biological knowledge of humans.
The neurobiology of morality 4. Indeed, many reflections from a scientifically-informed philosophy are of primary importance to maintain vigilance and scrutiny: what are the aims and uses of these biological studies of humans? Could they be used, for example, for a classification of people with consequences on the distribution of rights? Would this be justified? Would the consequent choices and decisions be acceptable?
How are scientific results co-opted in clinical practice and health care? How are communication issues with patients handled? How influential are social and cultural biases in the construction of the object of research? Is this acceptable and justifiable? What ideas of morality underlie the studies? Scientists working in these difficult grounds will constantly exercise philosophical thought see also 5. For them, the rich tradition of moral philosophy might constitute a precious aid. Meanwhile, philosophy of biology can inform philosophy about new and obsolete approaches in the scientific explanation of morality.
Evolutionary ethics is not necessarily tied to adaptationism 4. The evolution of morality seems to resemble more bricolage than engineering. Against stereotypical and simplified views of evolution, morality cannot be identified with a set of genes, even though genes do not necessarily lose their importance, and the question about heritable patterns remains crucial in order to define what morality is in evolution. Philosophy of biology can fight easy deterministic conclusions or identifications between naturalism and determinism while promoting useful definitions of the concepts involved: what is to be intended for morality in different contexts, and why finding an underlying arrangement of receptors is not going to replace the need for ethical reasoning and moral philosophy.
Science is a form of knowledge and therefore subject to epistemology, conceptual analysis and change, and ethical reasoning. On the other hand, biology constantly brings new fuel to philosophical inquiry, even, perhaps especially, when philosophical issues get naturalized.
Religious beliefs, philosophy and scientific theory
There are multiple senses in which philosophy of biology brings the life sciences out of their research contexts. First, philosophy of biology can study and sometimes aid interactions among the life sciences or between them and other sciences. Third, philosophy can reflect on the roles and meanings of science and on the interactions between science and society with an approach different from that of the social sciences. In this way, it can assume critical points of view towards biology and reflect on how scientific claims are, could be, and should be received and elaborated by the public.
What happens when different scientific fields or points of view come into intimate contact? Philosophy of biology has always been happily and effectively involved in this matter. A classic example seen above, 3. Philosophers of biology often notice attractions and tensions and call for integrations. They attend to emergent relationships among life sciences, as in the topical cases of micro- and macroevolution Serrelli and Gontier b and evo-devo see below , or between biology and other sciences, as in cultural evolution studies.
Classic debates in philosophy of science, for example on reductionism, provide conceptual coordinates for thinking about these connections. A major development in biology began in the s, when technical and theoretical advancements enabled the molecular study of development, opening the possibility of relating development to evolution in different ways Gilbert et al. Evo-devo , evolutionary developmental biology, was born. The contact was all the more significant because embryology, a discipline with an ancient tradition, had long been seen as far removed from evolutionary biology.
Many evo-devo protagonists and observers framed evo-devo within the insufficiency of the mathematical study of the intergenerational transmission of genes. Yet, many scholars are pursuing a pluralistic integration. They point out that. To deny the internal consistency and the explanatory power of [the research program developed from population genetics] would be obviously foolish…. The objection is that there can and should be more to evolutionary biology than a research program restricted to the concepts and tools of population genetics Minelli, cit. Some scientists and philosophers focus on a broader polemic target: the Modern Synthesis, that is the foundation of evolutionary biology as it is practiced today, which happened between the s and s and was further canonized mainly by Ernst Mayr in the subsequent decades.
These movements are very interesting to philosophers of biology. They provide new access to traditional philosophical issues about scientific change , including the unity and disunity of science Fodor , Callebaut They also invoke a necessary collaboration between history and philosophy of science, as shown by works that revised the received views on the nature of the divorce of embryology and evolution in the s Love , Griesemer cf. The idea of similarities across biological and cultural evolution was already suggested by Darwin and his contemporaries, and several approaches were formalized in the second half of the 20th century Cavalli Sforza and Feldman , Boyd and Richerson These evolution-inspired approaches to culture allow for a variety of unique mechanisms for cultural transmission, and incorporate processes like drift and multi-level selection.
Capitalizing on such approaches, some social scientists are proposing that methods, findings, and theories be systematically exchanged between the biological and cultural sciences, particularly between disciplines that lie at the same level on a micro-to-macro scale Mesoudi et al. Similar proposals call philosophers of biology into question.
- Guide to Evidence-Based Nursing Practice for Nurse Practitioners.
- Calculating the Expected Amount of Disposable Income of Project!
- The Witch Hunters Amulet.
- Rechtsirrtümer im Alltag (German Edition).
- Philosophy of Biology | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- The Boy Who Plaited Manes (The Fantasy Worlds of Nancy Springer Book 1).
The abstract formulations and philosophical issues of natural selection, multi-level selection, and drift 3. General topics like population thinking 4. Progressionism is another very basic issue here. The misleading idea of progress was in fact roughly applied in anthropology by evolutionists in the past with potentially discriminatory effects and reductionist justifications of essential diversities within the human species. Now, philosophy can assist cultural anthropology in updating old stereotyped worries about progressionism, overcoming a derived prejudice against naturalism as such.
1. Biographical Sketch
A coherent and analytical criticism of any form of teleological and progressive evolutionism could thus be a way to reconstruct the broken bridge between cultural anthropology and evolutionary studies Panebianco and Serrelli a. As we have seen, philosophy of biology is expected to help science and to work hard to keep up with scientific research.
But many authors point out that philosophy must not forget its critical role towards science. Grene and Depew Science can be seen as a part of culture and as a sub-system of society. This critical perspective on science, with its complex relationship with society, is always available to philosophers. Current knowledge overwhelmingly shows that human evolution is a bushy tree of coexistent and sometimes interacting hominin species compare Ruse But cultural and psychological biases have shaped science in some periods.
Human evolution was expected to be, and represented as, a ladder of progress, a sequence of progressively more evolved hominid species, substituting one another, and approaching Homo sapiens , the climax species, often represented as a European male Eldredge and Tattersall Although Gould was not a sociological relativist , he showed in many cases the importance of history in shaping science, where ideas may also be dismissed and then taken up again. The ubiquitous pattern of evolutionary stasis over geological time periods was neglected since Darwin , who considered fossils a constitutionally incomplete documentation.
But the pattern of stasis and punctuation was, as Eldredge and Gould pointed out, data, not lack of data. In fact, Eldredge and Gould formulated a theory that explained punctuations as speciation events, and stasis by other processes. In doing so, they posed several problems, among which was the legitimation of paleontology as a theoretically relevant field. He also exposed unconscious manipulations of the anthropometric measurements and ranking of skulls in Samuel G.
Gould found his measurements as biased by his self-confirming preconceptions.
For Gould, any scientist is an unconscious victim of his or her preconceptions. Along these lines, philosophy of biology is invited to take on its critical constructive role towards science. Many topics in philosophy of biology are evidently relevant in the relationship between biology and the public. Deciding the meaning of concepts, like natural selection, fitness, or function, requires an understanding of the theories and their domains Rosenberg and McShea The notoriously slow-changing world of science education and public understanding is under pressure by the impressive rate of life sciences growth.
In the popularization of science, hominid evolution is still depicted in a linear sequence of species from simple to complex, from inferior to superior, from archaic to modern. It exhibits intuitive power, not to neglect the prospective endurance of other influential pictures, like the tree of life, that are being questioned and made complex. Even important scientific advances, like evo-devo and other fields that are pushing for an Extended Evolutionary Synthesis, can be negligently interpreted as breaking-offs, invalidating all the previous knowledge.
Opponents of science can use this to covertly reintroduce non-naturalist and non-scientific explanations. Instead, philosophy of biology could help citizens become more scientific, and more able to exploit the directional role they have towards science cf. Haarsma et al. What are the ways of thinking used in biology that can help people to get a grasp of it?
Are they similar to everyday ways of reasoning? What are the possible conceptual traps and pitfalls? What kind of knowledge can we expect from ecological simulations? What are model organisms, and why is it important to establish and fund them? What kinds of predictions can really be made, for example, in medicine or ecology?
Grand Theories and Everyday Beliefs: Science, Philosophy, and their Histories
The selfish gene has been particularly appealing and controversial for its philosophical implications. We are unaware machines for our genes, whose interests furthermore sometimes conflict with and win over ours. The selfish gene view even came to be considered the official version of Darwinism, being the one defended and advocated on many public stages against non-scientific views. Universal Darwinism is a philosophical view, according to which natural selection, intended as the selective retention and accumulation of blind variations that prove to be stable and fit, is the fundamental mechanism in the Universe.
Grand Theories and Everyday Beliefs: Science, Philosophy, and Their Histories
Many philosophers of biology fought these views and all their philosophical implications, seeing them as a hardly justified reification of some methodologically operationalized idealizations by population genetics Oyama et al. Critics were all the more motivated by their discontent with the picture of evolutionary biology that was being conveyed to the public and to philosophy by the selfish gene view.
Many philosophers pointed out that natural selection is arbitrarily chosen as a process to be universalized into a general philosophical view Godfrey-Smith , and some outlined provocative alternative views like Universal Symbiogenesis Gontier Other philosophical views were elaborated from the importance of chance, randomness, and, more comprehensively, contingency in evolution.
Population genetics models show that important events like speciation can well happen in conditions of fitness neutrality Gavrilets Much earlier, population geneticists demonstrated the importance of drift see above, 2. But is evolution random or contingent at any spatio-temporal scale? Are there law-like tendencies in large-scale evolution? If so, do these concern adaptedness, complexity, or other features? Are trends towards greater complexity a better candidate? Some philosophers think so McShea and Brandon Others think that nothing in the current understanding of evolution predicts a drive towards increased complexity.
Another main disagreement concerns how to define complexity— is it through the integrated organization of interrelated parts in a whole or just through the number and diversity of parts? Some philosophers see evolution as a texture of contingent histories, the most ordinary—but most relevant to us—being the story of our species and their relatives. The human tree is just like that of other mammals. This emerging view is very different from the one inspired by Universal Darwinism:.
Evolution is a process that abounds in redundancies and imperfections, and adaptation could be a collateral effect rather than a direct optimisation. Biology is a field of potentialities, and not determinations…. Complex organisms exist thanks to imperfections, to multiplicity of use and redundancy. Pievani a: For authors like Stephen Jay Gould, the preeminence of ecological contingencies and macro-evolutionary patterns, like mass-extinctions, in natural history seems to dismiss any idea of progress in evolution:. We are the offspring of the material and contingent relationships between localised populations and ever-changing environments.
The massive contingency of human evolution means that particular events, or apparently meaningless details, were able to shape irreversibly the course of natural history. Ivi: Some theorists identify the source of contingency in the complex interplay between ecological systems and genealogical entities at multiple and very diverse scales Eldredge et al. From the disruption of the idea of a great progressive tendency in evolution, in particular human evolution, some philosophers develop general implications.
Evolutionary humility results from a naturalistic way of seeing Homo sapiens as a part of a contingent process and not as its culmination. From another point of view, the discovery of the determinant role of contingent ecological events like floods and earthquakes gives a new vision of nature. Nature is neither a harmonic Eden nor a wicked nemesis. Along the same line, philosophy of biology tends to be grounded on deep knowledge and understanding of current biology by maintaining a non-episodic familiarity with many fields that are outside philosophical specialization.
It is important to keep in mind that the life sciences and their objects change and grow. Answers, as well as philosophical problems, for such a topic come, for example, from scientific research on the origin of life Penny or the search for extra-terrestrial life.
The origin of life has been considered as a backwards extension of the roots of the tree of common descent. The symbiogenesis of eukaryotes and the advent of multicellularity are examples of major transitions. Those few moments in the history of life may be seen as points of emergence of a new level of organization. The history of biology is a history of changing views of life and of its history, and philosophy of biology participates into this process.
In the 50 years of existence of philosophy of biology as an academic field, the expansion of life sciences has been explosive. Huge global problems like climate change, biodiversity loss, new forms of diseases, and needs for resource management in our societies have contributed to that growth. Life sciences, including biomedical, ecological, and microbiological fields, have faced challenges related to the Modern world, not only by being called into question or by actively catching opportunities to develop big research projects and programs but also by contributing to the very discovery and perception of those challenges.
A parallel phenomenon of the decades leading into the 21st century has been the explosion and availability of scientific literature and access. What are the consequences for philosophy of biology? The discipline is supposed to have a role not only in understanding, describing, and communicating science but also in aiding the development of scientific programs. Given the explosive historical dynamics outlined above, almost every subfield of biology requires much of a philosopher to delve into its peculiar concepts, methods, objects , and conceptual issues.
Such multi-field presentations reflect the dynamic and lively development of biology. Meanwhile, periodical shifts of focus and emergence of new fields and techniques in the scientific literature, attract the curiosity and calling for the contribution of philosophers. Therefore, the field-by-field approach is not followed here. This first section provides a few examples of how philosophers of biology can chase the developments of some particular field of life sciences. In certain moments, this pursuit can lead to extensions of philosophy of biology itself to embrace not only new scientific knowledge , but also newborn ways of doing science.
Furthermore, deep revisions of philosophical approaches themselves may be necessary to address new aspects of science, namely facets of scientific practice. The examples concern molecular studies of gene exchange that started in microbial evolution, advances in ecological modeling, and the construction and management of model organisms.
In recent years, several philosophers have become interested in the growing evidence for a variety of gene exchange mechanisms widespread in fungi, plants, and animals, not only in prokaryotes unicellular organisms that have long been known to wildly transform, conjugate and acquire DNA by transduction. Following biologists such as W. Ford Doolittle, philosophers contrasted this evidence with the idea of a universal tree of life as a tree of sexually reproducing, genetically isolated species that multiply by genetic isolation.
The consequences of [such an] animal-centric philosophy of evolution are that it can include at best a severely truncated history of evolutionary events. As this example illustrates, philosophers, by following frontier developments of particular fields, can sense the need for a revision of overarching theoretical choices and frames of biology. The resilience of issues like the species concept , molded on animal breeding, is pushed by new concepts amenable to philosophical analysis.
Ecology has its own epistemological issues, for example, the weakness of ecological laws , the debate around the idea of balance of nature, the complex problem of the predictive value of ecological models, and the involvement in environmental decision making Cooper , Mikkelson , Plutynski Other problems concern the individuation of ecological units, scale-dependence, and generalizability of ecological models. Some philosophers got interested in new modeling methodologies of ecological inquiry, the area of the following example. Ecologist Steven Peck contributed to the debate from the standpoint of an author of complex computer simulations.
Moreover, simulations are not at all complicated versions of analytic models because, as Peck explains,. The complex computer representation is an ecological system. One that you have complete control over, but which provides insights and allows complex behavior to bubble up from lower level processes and allows one to capture the emergent behavior often seen in ecological systems.
For Peck, models of this kind are provocative for philosophical issues, such as what are models? What are their aims? How do they work? A classic and influential framework by Richard Levins identifies three constraints among which a model has to trade-off—generality, precision, and realism. But building a simulation, for Peck, does not consist in adding more variables and parameters in order to capture more parts and processes of some targeted biological system.
It is a creative effort yielding something autonomous with interesting but complex relationships with other models and with the world. But this distinction for Peck is not enough to capture the fact that simulations become experimental systems in themselves. Complex computer simulations push philosophy of biology to reflect on new accounts of model building and interpretation, and also to deal with new ways in which scientific communities structure themselves.
Chasing the state of the art of life sciences—even of one or few fields at once—is very demanding. By doing it, however, philosophers of biology can continually fuel their thought. We have seen, for example, that philosophers, relying on molecular discoveries about gene exchange, can revise their agenda, downplaying traditionally-framed problems for example, what is a species? By striving to understand scientific methodologies, including completely new ones such as computer simulations in ecology, philosophers are brought to probe their accounts of science to work out new ones, and to get a better hold on them and their connections.
Related to all these efforts there is another tension in philosophy of science, which has been made explicit in the last few years: the philosophical orientation toward scientific practice Boumans and Leonelli For Peck, simulations are more of experimental systems than representations. Logical analysis, either of the model alone or of its relationships with some natural ecological system, does not seem to bring philosophy a long way.
Another example of a rising scientific practice is constituted by model organisms, a term introduced in the late s and becoming more and more used. Official lists of model organisms include species such as the mouse, zebrafish, fruit fly, nematode worm, thale cress. Mice and other animals are extremely important in biomedical research due to the extrapolations to Homo sapiens that are considered possible with some conditions Piotrowska Ankeny and Leonelli define model organisms as:.
Non-human species that are extensively studied in order to understand a range of biological phenomena, with the hope that data and theories generated through use of the model will be applicable to other organisms, particularly those that are in some way more complex than the original model. The two philosophers work out several concepts embedded in this definition in order to capture the specificity of model organisms. For the issue at hand, the most important aspect is the new kind of structured scientific communities that maintain a model organism stable in space and time.
Examples of model organisms are the fly Drosophila melanogaster that has been studied since the dawn of genetics, knockout mice Mus musculus , and the plant Arabidopsis thaliana. To summarize, a recent stream in philosophy of biology associates the need for first-hand, recent, and deep scientific information with a need to consider newly emerged scientific practices that often involve innovative scientific communities and that are capable to generate new questions. By following biology, philosophy rethinks its own methods and foundations. Good philosophy of biology may be done non-historically, by working in a purely conceptual way.
On the other hand, philosophy is sometimes specifically interested in grand historical processes. Philosophical categories such as reductionism can be tested in their capability to account for the historical relationships between biological fields. At the birth of molecular genetics, for example, a philosophical question was whether the older Mendelian genetics was being reduced to it.
As Griffiths remarks, philosophers of biology achieved more adequate models of theory by debating whether or not the molecular revolution in biology was a case of successful scientific reduction. The recursive and expansive dynamics between history and philosophy of biology proves to be a generator of dense and complex elaborations in all the involved fields. James Griesemer constitutes an example of how philosophical views serve historical analysis. The topic is the molecular study of development at the heart of evo-devo see also 5.
Griesemer suggests a revision of conventional narratives that describe evo-devo as a union between genetics and development, the study of which was supposedly abandoned since the s see Gilbert et al. This dynamic becomes important when representations survive the experimental work in which they are produced and get used by other scientists. In scientific communities, process-marking and process-following strongly reinforce each other in an attention-guiding feedback, operated by representations.
Therefore, in this account, Mendel was a developmentalist who offered lasting representations that, in turn, helped some of his followers to focus on patterns of intergenerational transmission , backgrounding development. Whether the described implications are historical or philosophical is difficult to discern, particularly in such cases as evo-devo, which are in current philosophical focus. Philosophically, the view of scientists as process-followers is pretty well elaborated and detailed with the related notions of marking mental and manipulative , foregrounding and backgrounding, research styles, and so on.
Griesemer explicitly confronts his proposed view with more widespread approaches. For example:. The notion of following a process unifies [commonly separated] descriptions of science as theoretical representation, as systematic observation, and as technological intervention, [and] cuts across many analytical distinctions commonly used to describe science e. This local metatheorizing can be taken up by other philosophers and elaborated further.
Historians, too, are invited to test the view in describing other cases in the history of biology.
- The Contented Canine.
- Grand Theories and Everyday Beliefs: Science, Philosophy, and their Histories - Oxford Scholarship;
- Michel Foucault.
- All I Want For Christmas.
- Sun of gOd: Discover the Self-Organizing Consciousness That Underlies Everything!
- A Question of Latitude;
To historians, however, there is also a reflexive message: just as scientists mark and follow processes in the systems they study, so do historians with the social and historical processes they follow. This means that history and philosophy of science itself may be subject to research styles, and may need theoretical reorientations to gain a new understanding.
In general, for example, since narratives tend to follow historical developments within scientific styles, history often gives a false impression of scientific disciplines embryology and genetics, for example that are separate because their theories describe different processes, like development and heredity. In the specific case of study:.
Embryology is not well tracked in narratives that foreground the success of genetics after the split…. We have seen that philosophy of biology can be actively involved in some scientific activities. When this is not the case, philosophy of biology is largely an interpretive description or re-description of instances of biology.
The conclusion is that not only philosophy and science, but also history, form an entangled, integrated whole in current research, thought, and practice. Emanuele Serrelli Email: emanuele. Philosophy of Biology Philosophy of biology is the branch of philosophy of science that deals with biological knowledge.
Introduction According to several reconstructions of the history of philosophy of biology, the field emerged gradually in the s with a first generation of self-identified philosophers of biology, especially Morton Beckner, David Lee Hull, Marjorie Grene, Kenneth Schaffner, Michael Ruse, and William C.
However, as a mature and recognized field with its own interconnected practicing community, philosophy of biology seems to feature some methodological principles: Philosophy of biology is supposed to be scientifically informed and up-to-date , capturing how recent research modifies established knowledge and creates new scientific practices. Philosophy and biology are not always clearly distinct. Scientific work can routinely require, for example, conceptual or epistemological On the other hand, philosophy can turn out to be effective in setting up scientific research projects.
However, philosophy can be characterized by its leaning towards generalities about biology, namely general philosophical problems, general characterizations of fields and approaches within biology, or conceptualizations of biology as a whole or even of science as a whole. Philosophy of biology should try to be understandable and possibly useful to biologists.
The Legacy Of Christianity. References and Further Readings. I and II.