I discuss which functioning is relevant functioning in section 7, below. See her Sources of Normativity, esp. I discuss these parallels below in section 8. But I think it does point to a suggestive idea. The idea is first to determine what attitudes have it as a primary role to constitute and support Lockean ties of a sort that are characteristic of our temporally extended agency. We then appeal to the fact that the actor is, and understands herself to be, a temporally persisting agent whose agency is temporally extended to argue that some such attitudes can help determine where the agent stands at a time.
We tackle the problem of where the agent stands at a time by appeal to roles of attitudes in creating broadly Lockean conditions of identity of the agent over time. That is the idea. But what attitudes are these? A primary way in which we achieve organization and coordination of our activities over time is by way of settling on prior plans and policies.
In the most straightforward cases, these are plans and policies that directly concern action: a plan for writing the paper, say, or a policy of writing every morning for at least two hours. Such plans and policies induce overlapping webs of cross-temporal connections and continuities. I might, for example, see my writing this morning as embedded in a larger pattern of activity in which it is my policy to engage. Or I might see my writing chapter 2 as part of a larger planned project to write a book.
Further, the characteristic stability of such intentions and policies normally induces relevant psychological continuities of intention and the like. In these ways our plans and policies play an important role in the constitution and support of continuities and connections characteristic of the identity of the agent over time. Indeed, this is part of what plans and policies are for. Such plans and policies have as their function the support of cross-temporal organization and coordination of action in part by inducing cross-temporal connections for example, between prior plans or policies and later action, and between present intentional action and, later, planned activity and continuities for example, of stable plans and policies.
A point of having plans and planning and temporally extended agency 33 policies is to induce organization and coordination by way of such continuities and connections. Now, in weak reflection, we arrive at higher-order pro or con attitudes concerning our motivation. When we add our planfulness to such weak reflection, we introduce the possibility that in some cases these higherorder pro or con attitudes will be, more specifically, higher-order policies.
We may call such higher-order policies selfgoverning policies. The agent is, and understands herself to be, a temporally persisting agent whose agency is temporally extended. That is why we have been looking for higher-order attitudes whose roles are appropriately connected to the temporally extended structure of our agency.
Our discussion suggests that relevant self-governing policies are such attitudes. Self-governing policies are embedded in a planning framework whose organizing roles involve the constitution and support of Lockean continuities and connections characteristic of temporally extended agency. Further, such policies—unlike intentions and plans that concern only particular occasions—are explicitly concerned with the functioning of relevant desires Their role includes the support of certain temporally extended and coordinated patterns of functioning of those desires.
She endorses or rejects a desire, roughly, when relevant self-governing policies endorse or reject relevant functioning of the desire. But could one not have a self-governing policy from which one is estranged? This aspect of the problem of authority is endemic to appeals to hierarchies of higher-order attitudes. But at this point we can draw on a different Frankfurtian move. How should we understand such satisfaction? On the one hand, we do not want to preclude all psychological conflict. David Velleman agrees that such cases of depression pose a challenge to Frankfurt.
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On the other hand, a conception of satisfaction does need to preclude certain kinds of conflict. To say what is needed for satisfaction is to get clear about the kinds of conflict that are compatible with, and the kinds that are precluded by, strong reflective endorsement. I think that, to a first approximation, what is important here is the presence or absence of conflict with other self-governing policies. Suppose, for example, an agent has both a policy, P1, that supports his inclination to be distrustful of strangers, and a conflicting policy, P2, that rejects that inclination.
It is P1 that controls his relevant deliberation, planning, and action. His conflicting policies may expose him to charges of criticizable inconsistency; but it still may be true that he endorses his distrustful inclination. But it will be useful to work for now with the present proposal so as to see the shape of the theory that emerges. Such self-governing policies have it as part of their organizing role This example is due to Lawrence Beyer.
Reflection leading to this move to a second approximation was first prompted by a remark of Stephen Darwall. The details owe much to conversation with Gideon Yaffe. Self-governing policies are commitments that can, in an appropriate context, help determine where the agent stands with respect to certain motivation. This does not mean that these policies are immune to rational revision. One can sometimes reflectively reassess and revise where one stands. Our project is not to describe some irrevocable foundation at the bottom of all further practical reasoning; it is only to spell out what it is for an agent to take a stand in favor of or against certain motivations, a stand that can itself be subject to reexamination and revision.
Our initial proposal tries to do this by appeal to relevant self-governing policies in appropriate contexts of satisfaction. And it tries to capture the Heath notes n. When a desire for X motivates an action of an adult human agent, that agent normally treats X as an end that provides at least some minimal justification for action, a justification that is available for relevant deliberation.
This means that, in the normal case, the agent is to some extent aware that the desire for X is part of her motivation. It also means, I think, that the desire is not merely seen by the agent simply as something to be removed, as one might see an itch or a potential cause of future harm.
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Instead, the agent treats the achievement of the desired end as providing a perhaps minimal justification for the action, a justification that does not consist merely in the fact that the action is a way of removing that desire. Normally, then, when one is motivated by a desire, one treats that desire as providing a justifying end.
But there can also be cases in which these phenomena come apart. For related discussions see J.
Such cases have been emphasized by J. David Velleman. But the agent is not aware that this desire to destroy the stand is motivating him. Given this lack of awareness, it seems that, though the desire motivates his purposive activity, the agent himself does not treat the desire as providing an end that to some extent justifies knocking over the stand. So far, the agent seems to be seeing herself as a locus of causal forces and taking sides about which causal forces are to be effective. I endorse this, let us suppose, only because I endorse my effort to rid myself, at least for a time, of that very desire and its threatened consequences.
I endorse—as we might say—my letting off steam. But I do not endorse deliberation and practical reasoning in which I treat the end of getting the drug as an end that justifies action in a way that does not derive merely from the fact that the action will remove the desire. In such a case it seems to me that, while I endorse my letting off steam, I do not yet endorse my desire for the drug in the sense of strong endorsement we are trying to explain.
Another way to get at this point is to consider an objection to the hierarchical model that has been offered by Gilbert Harman. It is an intention that this very intention issue in action. Such an intention is, among other things, a second-order pro attitude in support of that which is motivating action. If one acts intentionally one will have such a second-order pro attitude.
There are signs that Frankfurt would agree. Frey and C. Since Frankfurt supposes that it is precisely such second-order pro attitudes that distinguish unreflective wantons from reflective persons, there is a flaw in the hierarchical theory. Or so Harman maintains. Return now to the view of strong endorsement we have been developing.
For the agent to endorse a desire is, to a first approximation, for that agent to have self-governing policies in favor of relevant functioning of that desire. Which functioning? Or so I have argued. Reflective endorsement is, after all, potentially explanatory of action. We want these two roles to be linked. There is an important discussion of related ideas in T. Below in section 9 I will make one further modification to this proposal. But first I want briefly to consider some related work by Christine Korsgaard.
One may have a policy of treating a desire as reason-giving so long as one continues to have that desire, and yet not be committed to trying to maintain that desire. Gilbert Harman discusses a case of both valuing and desiring something without desiring to continue to have that desire. He sees this case as an objection to the idea that valuing involves a higher-order pro attitude. But a corresponding objection to my account of reflective endorsement would not apply to the higher-order attitudes to which I am appealing.
Nozick notes relations to issues about personal identity on And see this volume, essay 6. Is there a criticizable circularity? An agent endorses a desire only if roughly she has a policy that favors her treating that desire as reason-giving in deliberation. I think we can do that, and that what will be crucial will be appeal not merely to processes of motivation but also to processes of reasoning though not to processes of reasoning that are of necessity endorsed by the agent ; but I will not try to defend this here. In this way my proposal defends a version of the hierarchical approach by drawing on resources provided both by the planning theory and by a broadly Lockean approach to personal identity.
Nevertheless, Sources of Normativity, For example, my account need not hold that full reflection must lead one to embrace morality as overriding. Korsgaard indicates that on her view it must Sources of Normativity, See also notes 20 and The special status that is accorded certain self-governing policies is grounded in the fact that such policies have, as a matter of function, a special relation to our temporally extended agency.
But this does not show that it is only such self-governing policies that have this special relation. Such an ideal might have a characteristic stability and might constitute and support various And this constitution and support of Lockean continuities and connections might plausibly be seen not merely as an effect but also as a function of such an ideal. Such higher-order concerns would then have, as a matter of function, a policy-like relation to temporally extended agency.
Would those higherorder concerns simply be self-governing policies? Perhaps not, for they may perhaps not be subject to quite the same demands for consistency and coherence as those to which policies are subject. Suppose my ideal of good citizenship brings with it a stable concern not to give weight to a desire to avoid inconvenience by not voting. Suppose that this stable higher-order concern helps structure my temporally extended agency by way of its support for Lockean ties. But suppose that I nevertheless give into temptation and decide this time to give weight to my desire to avoid inconvenience by not voting.
My decision goes against the higher-order concern built into my ideal. Nevertheless, this conflict with that higher-order concern may not bring with it the strong kind of inconsistency involved in deciding and so intending this time to X while intending generally not to X. Not all concerns that constitute and support organizing, Lockean ties are themselves general intentions. So we do not want to assume that the cited higher-order, policy-like concerns will always be self-governing policies, strictly speaking.
Let us call such higher-order policy-like concerns— when they are not, strictly speaking, general policies—self-governing quasi-policies. In this way we mark a significant similarity to self-governing policies while leaving room for differences in rational demands for consistency and the like. The structure of our argument then leads to a This is compatible with granting that one can have an ideal while remaining imaginatively alive to the attractions of alternative ideals. See P. In this essay, Frankfurt notes three distinguishing characteristics of caring. First: The outlook of a person who cares about something is inherently prospective; that is, he necessarily considers himself as having a future.
On the other hand, it is possible for a creature to have desires and beliefs without taking any account at all of the fact that he may continue to exist. The person necessarily binds them together, and in the nature of the case also construes them as being bound together, in richer ways. But the notion of guidance, and hence the notion of caring, implies a certain constancy or steadiness of behavior; and this presupposes some degree of persistence. Each of these three features of Frankfurtian caring has a parallel with what I have said to be features of plans and policies.
Such Frankfurtian carings, we might then say, have policy-like roles in support of our temporally extended agency. And such carings may include higher-order carings about the functioning of certain desires. There seems, however, no guarantee that these higher-order carings will themselves always be general intentions. So we can expect that certain kinds of carings will be self-governing quasi-policies. Let me note an important complexity here. Such singular higher-order decisions or intentions are not yet policies, but they do bring with planning and temporally extended agency 45 But why should I allow that viewpoint to determine where I stand on this present occasion?
But if it is coherent, it suggests a challenge to the view I have been developing. It suggests there can be a gap between, on the one hand, being endorsed by relevant policies or quasi-policies and, on the other hand, being endorsed by the agent. In response, we need to distinguish two different interpretations of the thought at issue. On one interpretation what is being challenged by the agent is her present package of self-governing policies and quasi-policies.
Perhaps the agent finds herself newly impressed with considerations that have not yet been articulated by her as policies or quasi-policies. The agent is wondering whether she should continue to be committed to these policies and quasipolicies or whether she should, instead, make changes in them. This is a perfectly coherent thought. And I recognize that they clearly reject D. I just want to ask whether I should let them determine where I stand on the present occasion with respect to D.
It is, of course, possible for the agent to act contrary to the cited package of policies or quasi-policies. But this by itself does not change the fact that she is not a time-slice agent but, rather, is and understands herself to be a temporally persisting agent whose agency is temporally extended. So it does not change the fact that this package of plan-like them distinctive normative demands of consistency and coherence. In cases of agency involving such singular commitments, the action is not grounded solely in the pushes and pulls of ordinary desires and aversions.
If she is no longer to reject D, there needs to be a change in relevant aspects of this package— a point recognized by her thought on the first interpretation. To effect that change she needs to change relevant policies or quasi-policies— though that might involve criticizable instability. In particular, our strong reflectiveness typically involves our planfulness and our related understanding of our agency as temporally extended.
In this respect, these core features do not challenge an important commonality between us and merely purposive agents. But our reflectiveness, our planfulness, and our conception of our agency as temporally extended are also, taken together, prime candidates for inclusion in that which is special about human agency. What is it to value something? When Watson tries in this paper to say what more it involves, he tends to identify valuing with judging good.
Notoriously, judging good has no invariable connection with motivation. One can in an important sense fail to value what one judges valuable.
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He was right to emphasize the centrality to our understanding of human agency including especially forms of free agency and self-determination of some notion of valuing. He was right to insist that to value is not merely to want, though valuing does involve wanting. And he was, I think, right later to note the need for a distinction between valuing and judging good. That said, we are still without a more detailed story about the nature of valuing. I want to sketch such a story. My proposal draws on several papers of mine.
Here I take myself to be in agreement with a number of other philosophers. Another example is J. We can, in particular, learn something important about valuing and its relation to the will. Let me make some brief remarks about how I will proceed. My aim is to see a number of different models of agency as reasonable stages in a sequence of creature constructions.
At each stage in the sequence, I will try to identify an issue or problem that suggests some sort of modest addition to or extension of the earlier design. How does such a series of possible constructions tell us something about our own actual agency? Part of the answer is that the methodology depends on our arriving at a model of agency that recognizably applies to us—to adult human agents in a broadly modern world.
I hasten to add, though, that such a series need not be a unique route to a model of these core features; it need only be one intelligible route in which the steps along the way build appropriately on their antecedents. But why not simply describe the final model of agency? Why bother with prior stages in the sequence of constructed creatures? The answer is that such a construction can help clarify how complex elements of our agency build on but differ from less complex elements. I think this is in particular helpful when we come to valuing. The model I arrive at in the end involves, as already indicated, a merger of hierarchical and planning structures.
By seeing this model as an outcome of a sequence of constructed creatures we are in a position to identify different conceptions of valuing and to clarify their relations to each other. Let me add that, as will become clear below, this methodology also helps me articulate relations between several different ideas about planning agency that I have discussed elsewhere. Let us suppose that Creature 1 has both beliefs about its world and various desires concerning different possible states in that world, including different possible acts it might perform. These desires need not be organized in any systematic way and may well come into conflict in particular cases.
When there is conflict, Creature 1 is moved to act by its strongest desire or cluster of desires at the time of action. Creature 1 is pushed and pulled by its desires. It is an agent in only a minimal sense. Behavioral outputs are as much attributable to the particular desires that were, on the occasion, strongest, as they are to an agent in any important sense different from those desires.
In search of more robust forms of agency, let us consider a creature who is more reflective about its desires than creature 1. It acts only after it has considered what it desires in light of its beliefs, including beliefs about what relevant experiences are like. Sometimes such consideration changes what it desires. Perhaps it begins with a desire to fly to a distant land; yet, after consideration of what such an experience is really like, it comes to desire not to take the trip.
And let us construct a second creature, Creature 2. Creature 2 acts on the basis of its beliefs and considered desires. Because its desires are considered, it differs from Creature 1. Gauthier suggests p. This is a complexity I will put to one side here. To be more realistic, we might limit ourselves to saying that Creature 2 has the capacity to make the transition from unconsidered to considered desires but does not always do this. But it will keep the discussion more manageable to simplify and to suppose that all its desires are considered. But a creature—call it Creature 3—might itself try to weigh considerations provided by such conflicting desires in deliberation about the pros and cons of various alternatives.
In the simplest case, such weighing treats each of the things desired as a prima facie justifying end. In the face of conflict it weighs such desired ends, where the weights correspond to the motivational strength of the associated, considered desire. But in the process of weighing the desired ends are treated as justifying, and the deliberation tracks that. Creature 3, then, has this capacity for a kind of deliberation in the face of conflicting desires.
In this respect it goes beyond Creature 2. But since the weights it invokes in such deliberation correspond to the motivational strength of the relevant considered, desires though perhaps not to the motivational strength of nonconsidered desires , the resultant activities will match those of a corresponding Creature 2 all of whose desires, we are assuming, are considered. Each will act in ways that reveal the motivational strength of considered desires at the time of action. But for Creature 3 it will also be true that in some though not all cases it acts on the basis of how it weighs the ends favored by its conflicting, considered desires.
It may, for example, want to nurture a vegetable garden or to build a house. Such See Alfred R. I do not say this is a principle that Creature 3 itself appeals to in its deliberation. What it does now will depend not only on what it now desires but also on what it now expects it will do later given what it does now. It needs a way of settling now what it will do later given what it does now. The point is even clearer when we remind ourselves, what we have so far ignored, that Creature 3 is not alone.
It is, we may assume, one of some number of such creatures; and in many cases it needs to coordinate what it does with what others do so as to achieve ends desired by all participants, itself included. It needs others to be able reliably to predict what it will do later given what is done now. There are, then, substantial pressures for mechanisms that support coordination and organization, both within the life of a particular creature and across the lives of a number of interacting creatures.
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Such mechanisms, further, need to respect basic limits we can expect to characterize the psychology of such creatures. We need to add to the design of Creature 3 structures that support coordination, intrapersonal and interpersonal, in ways compatible with these limits. A plausible strategy here would be to add capacities to settle in advance on complex but partial plans of action.
So let us add such planning structures to the structures of considered desires and beliefs characteristic of Creature 3. Creature 4, then, is a planning agent. Given their role in coordination, such plans will normally need to satisfy demands for consistency and coherence. They also will normally need to be stable, to be This is a general point of Herbert Simon. See, e. This is a theme of my Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.
Otherwise such plans would not play their needed role in organized activity. Further, in having such plans, our creature will need to be able to think of itself as the agent of actions at different times, of actions now and later. It will need to be able to think of itself as an agent who persists over time, one who begins and eventually completes temporally extended projects.
Creature 3, at any moment of choice, asks only what present action is best supported by its current beliefs and considered desires. Creature 4, in contrast, also has available plans of action settled on earlier. On some occasions of action, Creature 4 can simply continue with what it had earlier planned to do rather than step back and reconsider what present action is best supported by its current beliefs and considered desires.
This is what is involved in having stable plans of action.
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In constructing Creature 4 we need to characterize this stability. In the basic case of interest, Creature 4 has a prior plan to act in certain ways in its present circumstance, a prior plan formed on the basis, in part, of earlier beliefs about what its now-present circumstances would be.
It is now faced with new information about its present circumstances, information that it did not anticipate when it formed its prior plan. When should it reconsider its prior plan in light of this new information? How stable should its plan be in the face of such new information? These are questions about how to design the newly introduced planning structures. We want our answer to involve a modest extension from structures already present.
We distinguish two different cases. There are, first, cases in which there is a present option that is known by the creature to be clearly favored by its present, relevant beliefs and considered desires. In such a case, it will simply do what it now knows to be favored by those present beliefs and desires. In a second case, it is not clear to the creature what the outcome would be of reconsideration of its prior plan in light of its new information.
Now, there are costs of time and attention to stopping always to reconsider a prior plan in light of such new information. To the extent that a strategy of always reconsidering would make one less predictable to cognitively limited agents like oneself, there are further costs tied to needs for coordination. These costs are magnified for a creature whose various plans are interwoven so that valuing and the will 55 a change in one element can have significant ripple effects that will need to be considered.
So let us suppose that the general strategies Creature 4 has for responding in such a case to new information about its circumstances are sensitive to these kinds of costs. Its strategies are designed so that by following them, a limited creature with basic needs for coordination will tend to promote, in the long run, the satisfaction of its considered desires and preferences. We can suppose that in some instances of the second kind of case this will mean that Creature 4 follows through with a prior plan even though, had it explicitly reconsidered in light of its present considered desires and relevant beliefs, it would have acted differently.
But it has a problem. It can expect that its desires and preferences, though considered, may well change over time in ways that tend to undermine its efforts at organizing and coordinating its activities over time. Perhaps in many cases this is due to the kind of temporal discounting emphasized by among others George Ainslie. This plan may be grounded in its considered preference for exercising every day over never exercising.
Its problem, though, is that each day, when faced with exercising then, it tends even after full consideration to prefer a sequence of not exercising on the present day but exercising all days in the future, to a uniform sequence of exercising each day, the present day included. At the end of the day, it returns to its earlier considered preference in favor of exercising on each and every day. Nevertheless, its plan or policy27 of exercising every day will be in trouble. Each day, when it comes time to exercise, it will prefer—and this will be a considered preference—not exercising that day.
See Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason, chap. I see policies as intentions that are general in relevant respects. See my Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason, at pp. This is not, after all, a case in which it is unclear at the time of action what would be the result of reconsideration, in light of new information, of the prior plan to exercise today. It is patently clear to the agent, at exercise time on each day, that it presently prefers not to exercise on the present day, though this considered preference will, it knows, change back later in the day.
So Creature 4 will systematically undermine its prior exercise plan or policy. Such cases of temptation, driven perhaps by temporal discounting, are likely to be quite common. Indeed, as Ainslie would emphasize, it seems an important fact about agents like us that such temptations systematically arise even when desires are considered.
We can better equip our creatures for this fact about their own psychologies by providing for prior plans and policies that are stable in ways stronger than that envisaged in the construction of Creature 4. Well, a planning agent sees itself as an agent who persists through time. In planning, it is planning for its own future. Built into the capacity and disposition to be a planning agent is a commitment to giving some sort of significance to how it itself will in the future see its present actions. This suggests that we construct a creature whose plans are stable in the following, further way: there is a tendency to stick with a prior plan, despite a present and considered preference to the contrary, when it knows that it would later regret abandoning the plan and would later welcome having stuck with the plan despite its now-present preference.
To And see this volume, essay And, without going into details, I think it is clear how plans and policies that were stable in this further way might help in cases of temptation. A creature whose plans were stable in ways in part shaped by such a no-regret principle would be more likely than Creature 4 to resist temporary temptations. So let us build such a principle into the stability of the plans of Creature 5. Creature 5 is, like Creatures 3 and 4, an agent with considered desires and preferences and an agent who deliberates in light of those considered desires and preferences.
Creature 5 is, like Creature 4, a planning agent. It is also grounded in the central concerns of a planning agent with its own future, concerns that lend special significance to anticipated future regret. Nevertheless, these desires and preferences sometimes change over time in ways that lead to problems about temptation and, more generally, to various forms of crosstemporal incoherence.
Such changes may well lead to conflict with prior plans and policies. That was why we strengthened the stability of the plans and polices of Creature 5 by adding a other things equal no-regret principle. But these tensions between prior plans and policies, on the one hand, and present, considered desires and preferences, on the other hand, also elicit pressure to reflect further on those desires and preferences themselves.
Given the tension between these preferences and prior plans and policies, there is reason to give the creature the ability to reflect further and to ask itself whether it really wants a given desire or preference to play the cited roles in its agency. The significance of a version of this question has been a major theme in work of Harry Frankfurt. See esp. It seems that it does. A desire to smoke might in fact survive consideration even though it is a desire the creature, on reflection, would rather not have and would rather did not shape its deliberation and action. So there is reason to add to our creature sufficient resources to arrive at its own reflective endorsements or rejections of its desires.
How should we understand such resources? Since it was the ability to take its own stand that we were trying to provide in the move to Creature 6, we need some response to this challenge. A successful response will need to introduce further structure; but we will want to see whether that further structure need involve only a modest extension from features that are already present in Creature 6. Now, Creature 6 is both a hierarchical and a planning agent.
Perhaps there are resources implicit in the planning structures that can be used to supplement the hierarchical structures in a way that addresses the cited problem of authority. Indeed, I think there are. As a planning agent, Creature 6 has plans and policies concerning its actions. It is a short step to plans and policies concerning the functioning of its own desires. In particular, it is a short step to policies in favor of or against relevant functioning of relevant desires.
The second of these models is that of the Pecking Order model, which states that corporate debt decisions are driven by the firm's desire to finance investment first internally, then with risky debt and finally with external equity i. Citi group: taking sides words - 4 pages structure? The debate ensues because there are many challenges. Although there were many restrictions Citigroup faced, such as China's banking regulations, regulatory reforms, and terms and conditions of the WTO membership, Citibank used these limitations to its advantage and became the first foreign bank to receive approval for foreign currency dealings.
As a result, in Citigroup was one of the most powerful financial service companies in the world. Ethical Accounting Failure: The Enron Scandal words - 6 pages firm performance and executive compensation. The methodology test type that I like was data collected from varies industries using the ownership structure and instructional environment. Insider Trading words - 6 pages structure of the economy. This framework allows me to analyze which is the optimal IT regime among the considered alternatives, and it can be extended to analyze further executive compensation schemes.
One key element of the model proposed here is the presence of two agency problems between the corporate manager and the firm's shareholders. Consider the following situation for a corporate manager: first, she must acquire information regarding the. The Influence of Socialization on the Individual words - 5 pages. Although we manage our roles and they seem natural, they are in reality roles that have been assembled by society. It is ruled entirely by structure as opposed to agency.
Subsequently, ethnicity, age, gender, religion and social class play are significant part in influencing the self. There and Back Again words - 7 pages why would protagonists want to return home? A small subsection of this chapter will compare the journey-and-return-home structure in the selected classic novels to that in more contemporary texts in order to discover whether there is a noticeable difference between them, and if so, how it could impact the escapism debate.
Based on the specific line of inquiry and focus on narrative structure, it will be possible to evaluate whether the findings. Creative talents may walk away and so may the 50 non-majority-owned offices. She therefore engages in a deliberate effort at persuading, negotiating and networking with her entire organisation. Since the s, the term corporate governance has become a business jargon around the world.
Similar Essays Police Officers: Their Work And Actions: Structure Agency Debate words - 5 pages In order to understand the attitudes towards police work and the actions of police officers one can make use of the Structure-agency debate which has three distinct perspectives; structure, agency and structuration.
This essay shall argue which position is best to apply by drawing on sociological theories and concepts. Sociology scholars, including Giddens attempted to integrate the two in order to end the debate. The attempts to integrate the two emphasizes on the complimentarily meaning that the structure influences the individual and the agent has the capability to change the structure. This paper looks at the views of Giddens regarding the two concepts.
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The paper also looks at the way Giddens tried to integrate the two through, by coming up with structuration theory. Giddens used the notion of temporality, capability, and knowldgeability to explain the actions of agent in society. He observed that an agent has various capabilities that enable him or her to act differently, under different circumstances.
For change to take place in any given human society, an agent must exist freely. Agency could perhaps be defined differently to mean reflective supervision of human behavior. Giddens believed that human beings have the ability to monitor their actions, including the contexts of such actions. He used the term capability to mean that agents are able to portray a number of actions at ago. For instance, he advised that human beings behave differently under different settings and conditions. Each person tries to evaluate his or her character and expects others to assess their actions before exposing them to the public.
According to Giddens, structures are the outcomes of human actions. Through the process of reflective monitoring, people are capable of transforming human actions. Agents use their knowledge to rationalize an act implying that people act differently because they differ in terms of knowledge. He therefore used the term knowledgeability to imply that human beings have various forms of knowledge that are used differently in society. All human beings tend to scrutinize their actions thoughtfully. Even though human beings are supposed to act in accordance with societal rules and regulations, they are also supposed to use common due to their knowledgeability.
People behave differently because of their capability and knowledgeability. Some are perceived to act morally while others are known to go against societal laws regularly. Giddens observed that two forms of consciousnesses inform the capabilities of an individual. The first one is the practical consciousness, which means the reasoning power or the expertise of the individual. This form of consciousness is not easily recognized in everyday life.
Another form of consciousness is the discursive realization. This form of consciousness helps an individual to express knowledge. Giddens suggested that individuals have philosophical and relative and knowledge, which helps them to institutionalize structures. In order to be able to institutionalize structures, agents must possess adequate knowledge.
Giddens was quick to mention that some factors could perhaps restrain the actions of an individual. He termed such factors as capability constraints. The factors may include the age of the individual, cognitive restrictions and physical health of an individual, which bars an individual from performing certain duties.
Others factors include time and space. At certain ages for instance, it would be impossible for an individual to execute some tasks. The most limiting factor is the correlation between the movement of space and the time movement. Moreover, the geographical location of an individual could perhaps affect his or her behavior in society. Some places call for certain behaviors only. For instance, people attending a class would be required to pay attention and avoid unnecessary conversations. Regionalization is another factor meaning that some actions are not displayed in certain regions.
For instance, an individual would wish to exercise prostitution but the Islamic rules would not permit him or her. This means that the region would have played a critical role in controlling the behavior of an individual. Presence is another factor that restrains the actions of an individual. For instance, an individual would only talk in the presence of another person.